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**AN ARMY STRATEGY -- A JUSTIFIABLE INITIATIVE
OR A PAROCHIAL PLOY?**

BY

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AN ARMY STRATEGY - A JUSTIFIABLE INITIATIVE
OR A PAROCHIAL PLOY?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Both the Air Force and the Navy have separate service strategies which have been effective in articulating their perspectives and requirements. Currently, the Army does not espouse an independent strategy. This study will propose and analyze the effectiveness of an Army strategy within the framework of the national military strategy. The proposed strategy will focus on the strategic environment in the last decade of the twentieth century.

The author proposes that the Army develop a force development strategy rather than an operational strategy. This strategy is based on several factors: the changing strategic environment, fiscal constraints, a lack of priority in the national military objectives, and the uncertainty of predicting and justifying a threat.

INTRODUCTION: THE WINDS OF CHANGE

The historic winds of change are creating a maelstrom of uncertainty in our national military strategy process. The Warsaw Pact's dissolution and the Soviet Union's revolutionary refocusing on internal political and economic reform have significantly reduced the threat to Western Europe. Consequently, many American leaders and analysts support defense budget reductions because the Cold War has been won and America must now solve critical domestic issues. These changes are shaking the foundation of Army force requirements--the defense of Europe. As Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel stated, " events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have moved so rapidly that we have literally no time to be astonished." ¹

As the entire world reels from these events, the winds of war blowing from the Persian Gulf are further complicating the strategic environment. An ad hoc coalition of 34 countries has successfully fought a limited war against Iraq and forced its withdrawal from Kuwait. Many believe this conflict is a precursor of conflict resolution in a newly emerging, multipolar world.

So how does this evolving world order affect the national interests of the United States? More importantly, how will the changing military balance and potential for military conflict affect the national military strategy and the Army's role in that strategy? These changes mandate alterations to the Army. Colonel (Ret.) Art Lykke believes this is essential:

As times change, national interests change, and our policies and military strategies should also change. This is easier said than done. Too often military strategies and defense agreements remain locked in concrete even though the environment has been altered. 2

The Army approach can no longer be business as usual. Under the strategy of flexible response, the Army used an operational strategy based on forward deployment to deter the Soviet threat to Western Europe. If this threat has significantly diminished, how does the Army justify its existence? I believe the Army must orient on a force development strategy focused on capabilities rather than a future undefined threat. Threat analysis will still be an integral part of the strategy formulation but it will not be the sole rationale for justification. Admittedly, this will be difficult to justify to a Congress conditioned to a process that is based on a measurable threat and is often influenced more by parochial constituent interests rather than national defense interests.

I will propose that the Army adopt a global force development strategy as a strategic vision to focus the allocation of scarce resources and establish priorities among the variety of missions that evolve from the national military objectives. In the past, the Army proposed a force structure based on a perceived threat. This structure was then revised through a series of internal reviews by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Congress. Throughout this process, the budget was the predominant constraint. This inevitably resulted in a "requirements-capabilities" mismatch. So why not consider the budget constraint at the beginning of the process?

Further, if resources are constrained, then missions must receive a priority. Every mission cannot be the number one priority.

If the national military strategy does not specify any priorities, then the Army must develop priorities, as a crucial first step in the strategy process.

Mr. Robert Komer states: " The essence of real-life strategic decision making is to face up to the hard choices among competing needs in the context of constrained resources...this dictates that we rank our strategic aims in order of priority for resource allocation." ³

To develop this strategy, I will assess the impact of the following elements: the strategic environment, US national interests, and the national military objectives. Based on these elements, I will formulate the ends, ways, and means of a global Army strategy. I will examine each concept (way) in terms of risk. That is, whether the ends can be achieved using the stated means.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The economic, political, and military trends in both the international and domestic arenas comprise the strategic environment. These elements are the broad areas in which nations interact and which influence national interests. International trends can create conflicts which could degenerate into armed conflict if a nation perceives its interests to be threatened. In addition to international trends, domestic trends also influence the formulation of national interests and shape how a nation will respond to conflict.

The world is becoming increasingly economically interdependent. Developing economies create competing demands for scarce natural resources.

Countries are no longer self-sufficient but they are inextricably linked through economic interdependence. " While Clausewitz called war a continuation of politics by other means, economics may become a continuation of war by other means. There may be virulent trade wars among the Economic Big Three- Europe, Japan and America (whose sphere should eventually include Canada and Mexico in an American Economic Community). " 4

In the Americas, the US efforts to stem narcotic production and trafficking are a major concern for the US government. For practically every Latin American country; reduction of foreign debt, currently 430 billion, will be the key economic issue in revamping economies. The Enterprise for Americas Initiative, promoting a free trade zone from Alaska to Chile, will shape economic efforts in this hemisphere. Migration and immigration from Central American countries to the United States is increasing and is a significant factor in the US economy. Thus, the hemisphere's focus will be on economic growth, reduction of the drug trade, and population stabilization.

Western Europe is trying to solidify a European Economic Community which will be a formidable economic power. Eastern European nations are trying to rebuild deteriorating economies and will need massive infusions of aid. Eastern European nations will be looking to Western Europe and the rest of the world to provide the financial support and raw materials that were previously supplied by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's departure has given Europe an unexpected opportunity to revitalize the continent's economic posture, although it will be very costly.

The Pacific has quietly emerged as an economic powerhouse. Led by Japan; South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have built robust international economies which continue to diversify in their attempts to achieve market superiority. Malaysia and Indonesia have the highest growth rates in the world and are becoming important exporting nations. While they have an abundance of manpower, they are critically dependent on Brunei and, to some extent, the Middle East for oil.

The political sphere is the most volatile component of the strategic environment. The USSR is literally fighting for survival to maintain control of areas such as the Baltic states who are pressing for independence. The Palestinian issue continues to dominate middle eastern politics and will be a destabilizing influence until resolved. The Joint Chiefs believe that :

Actions by a smaller country can have a significant impact on a large nation's political fate. Traditional animosities will continue to foment in many regions of the world, and the United States will be confronted by the emergence of more assertive regional powers. ⁵

Third world nations must respond to the pressures of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and citizens' expectations for self-determination. Insurgent forces in Africa, the Philippines, and the Americas pose a threat for emerging governments struggling to gain credibility and stability.

While the military balance between the United States and the USSR has not changed, the willingness of the Soviet Union to use its military influence in the international arena has diminished. The collapse of the Soviet economy and threats to political stability have caused Soviet leadership to focus on internal issues.

The Soviet's begrudging participation in the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreements is an indicator that the Soviets must set their internal house in order and can no longer afford to sustain large military forces outside of the Soviet Union. These two initiatives propose to mutually reduce the numbers of conventional and nuclear weapons available to NATO countries and the Soviet Union. As CIA Director Webster told the House Armed Services Committee in March 1990:

Even if a hardline regime were able to retain power in Moscow, it would have little incentive to engage in major confrontations with the United States. New leaders would be largely preoccupied with the country's urgent domestic problems, and would be unlikely to indulge in a major military buildup." 6

This withdrawal will significantly affect one of the key factors in our military presence in Europe, the time available to NATO forces for deployment and mobilization of reserves prior to the start of hostilities. A senior JCS official, MG John Robinson, confirmed that "The unilateral Warsaw Pact reductions would have a dramatic impact on warning time...the estimate of warning time in National Intelligence Estimate-41 (33 to 44 days) would have to be increased by a factor of four or five." 7 For NATO countries, increased warning time means more flexibility in crisis action planning, force positioning, and the use of reserve forces.

The Soviet retrenchment will have just as dramatic an impact on the rest of the world. The US and USSR had developed a workable set of checks and balances which helped to defuse some conflicts short of war.

Now there may very well be a power vacuum which aggressive countries will be eager to fill and exploit. The current Persian Gulf crisis may have been caused by this phenomena. Also, the probability of the US being involved in simultaneous conflicts or horizontal escalation has been greatly reduced by the USSR's changed posture. Mr. Jeffrey Record believes that " A continuing ability to deter the big war in Europe is a precondition if not a guarantee of America's capacity to wage small wars successfully outside Europe." 8

Another factor affecting the international military balance is the proliferation of international arms sales. Emerging regional powers are acquiring more sophisticated weaponry, including chemical ones, and this trend will close the gap between the superpowers and regional powers. The Working Group on the Future Security Environment believes this is a serious issue:

Brazil, Israel, South Korea, China, and India will be able to produce ample supplies of weapons for other buyers. As the spread of weapons production capacity makes arms more of a buyer's market, the capacity of competing sellers and the advantaged buyers to do mischief will grow...the larger more sophisticated arsenals of regional military powers will also affect the conditions for US or Soviet intervention. Any intervention force designed to have a quick military effect will have to be large or have a large margin of superiority. 9

The increase in weapons production will have a long term impact on regional balances of power. Currently there are ten potential US adversaries which have at least 500 tanks in their armies: Soviet Union (53,300), People's Republic of China(11,450), India(2,750), North Korea(2,900), Vietnam(1,600), Iraq(4,500), Iran(1,000), Syria(4,000), Egypt(2,250), and Pakistan(1,600). 10 Except for the Soviet Union, all of these countries are land based powers and are continuing to improve

their land forces. Other developing nations are also building up their ground and air forces because the most likely threat to most nations is a ground threat.

We are already experiencing the effects of the changing military balance and the proliferation of arms sales in the Persian Gulf War. This war also illustrates another important facet of the international military balance: the emergence of formal and ad hoc coalitions. The US made great diplomatic efforts to gain international support and avoid a unilateral action. As Mr. Grunwald, a noted economist, observes:

The US cannot and should not undertake them (Third World conflicts) alone. In the emerging, decentralized world, no single power will play the kind of predominant part that was possible in the 19th and 20th centuries. It will be an era of diffused power. ¹¹

The international trend toward economic interdependence will be complemented by a desire to gain support of the world community before employing armed intervention.

In summary, the international arena presents a myriad of interwoven trends with implications for military strategy:

- The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact organization and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe.
- The economic and domestic turmoil within the USSR.
- A coalition force of Western and Arab nations fighting a limited war against Iraq.
- The inability of the major powers to control events in the Third World.

- The pressures of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and the desire for economic and political self-determination increasing the probability for armed conflict in the Third World.

- The Americas emerging as a new force in the US economy.

- The economic challenges of rebuilding Eastern Europe.

The US's domestic environment is just as dynamic, and perhaps more influential in shaping US interests and national military strategy. Now that the cold war has been won, US leaders want to place more emphasis on solving internal issues and reducing defense expenditures. This does not mean a return to "isolationism" but; rather, a realization that resources can be channeled into other areas because of a diminished and changed threat from the Soviet Union.

The commitment of US forces to the Persian Gulf demonstrates some American attitudes that will shape military strategy in the future. Once US forces are committed, the country wants to win quickly, decisively, and with the least possible cost in lives. Mr. Carl Builder, a strategist and analyst with the Rand Corporation, reinforces this observation:

The Army must prevail in order to meet public expectations in these so called low- intensity or Nth country conflicts, wars in which Soviet involvement is either indirect or negligible. The Army will not be measured by its ability to deter such wars, but by its ability to intervene effectively if they occur and American vital interests are at stake. 12

There is also a reluctance to use force because we cannot control all of the consequences of its use. The US public is doubtful of the utility of US military intervention and whether it can really solve a complex problem or simply exacerbate it.

As Jeffrey Record notes: " Many Americans regard most of the Third World as a place in which the US has no clear cut security interests worth fighting for." ¹³ The need to clearly justify the use of force as being in America's interests will be a crucial requirement for US leaders. The American public is becoming much more sophisticated in distinguishing between "interests" and "vital interests" and which ones they are willing to support American soldiers dying to protect.

Another outgrowth of the Persian Gulf conflict is collective responsibility and bilateral action. The public does not want to be the " world's policeman". They expect other nations to fully participate in their own defense and in conflicts like the Persian Gulf. There is growing support for Western European nations to assume more of the NATO defense role and to withdraw US forces from Europe. " The Europeans ought to be encouraged to pursue the development of their own military capability such that, at some point, they can assume independent responsibility for their defense and diplomacy." ¹⁴ All of these attitudes indicate a desire, if not a necessity, for bilateral actions if the US leaders want public support for intervention.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

There are some dominant themes emerging from the strategic environment which will influence an Army strategy in the 1990s and well into the 21st century. The Soviet conventional threat to Western Europe has significantly diminished. Europe will have an internal focus attempting to rebuild the former Warsaw Pact countries' economies.

Also, German public pressure to reduce the US military presence will be a major political factor.

The growing potential for Third World conflicts will threaten US interests and increase the likelihood of US armed intervention. Conversely, the reluctance of the American public to support armed intervention will influence US leaders' decisions. There will be growing domestic pressure to reduce defense spending and concentrate on internal problems. All of these trends will affect US interests and the national military strategy.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS

In an ideal world, national interests would not change and national military strategy would be stable. However, changes in the strategic environment and each administration's perception of US interests continually reshape America's national security policy. In the past, US policy seemed to evolve as a reaction to events. President George Bush made the first attempt to publish a national strategy when he published "The National Security Strategy of the United States" in March 1990. I will use this document as the source for developing current and future US national interests.

The military strategist's challenge is to translate broad, sometimes ambiguous, national interests into clearly defined military objectives or ends. In order to develop my Army strategy, I intend to examine these stated interests and objectives for missions which would apply to the Army.

In the above document, two issues appear to be vital US interests: promote a free and open international economic system, and prevent any hostile power from dominating the Eurasian land mass.¹⁵ These vital interests are further expanded into four national interests and further subdivided into nineteen objectives. While not explicitly stated, it implies that the US's strategy will still be containment but with a regional perspective because of the diminished Soviet threat to Europe. Instead of containing Soviet expansion, the focus will be on containing aggression or unlawful expansion by regional powers.

Before proceeding any further, the term "vital interest" needs to be defined. Vital is attached when a policy maker desires to illustrate the intensity of a national interest. As Mr. Donald Nuechterlein states:

An interest is vital when the highest policy-makers in a sovereign state conclude that the issue at stake is so fundamental to the political, economic, and social well-being of their country that it should not be compromised- even if this may result in the use of economic and military sanctions.¹⁶

As a result, the term vital is used to describe the consequences of the policy maker's decision when a conflict threatens a national interest. It means the leader is willing to use force if necessary to protect the national interest. Thus, President Bush determined that it was in the vital interests of the United States for Iraq to unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait in order to maintain stability in the Middle East. In 1980, President Carter stated, in the Carter doctrine, that it was in the vital interests of the United States to insure the world's access to Middle Eastern oil. So, vital interests may change dependent upon each administration's interpretation of US national interests.

Currently US national interests are categorized into four major categories with complementary objectives:

1. The survival of the United States with its values, institutions, and people secure.
 - deter military attack, and if that should fail, repel or defeat it and end the conflict on terms favorable to the US.
 - deal effectively with threats to the security of the US and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism.
 - improve strategic stability by strengthening conventional capabilities.
 - reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the US.
2. A healthy and growing US economy to ensure individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.
 - ensure access to foreign markets, energy, and mineral resources.
 - promote an open and expanding international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investments.
3. A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.
 - maintain stable regional military balances to deter powers that might seek regional dominance..
 - aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.
4. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
 - strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations.
 - support greater defense integration in Western Europe.
 - work with the NATO alliance to bring about security and democracy in Europe.¹⁷

This list does not include all of the US objectives. Rather, it only includes those which may involve the military element of power and more specifically; the Army.

REFINING US INTERESTS

While this list of interests and objectives is a good startpoint for the formulation of military objectives it is not complete.

One must examine current and past administrations' policy interpretations to determine how these broad interests and objectives are interpreted in the strategic environment. Hopefully, this analysis will provide clues as to which geographic area and countries are more important than others. Also, these interests must be studied in the framework of the changing strategic environment for the future. Ideally, there would be a priority, or degrees of intensity, among all of these interests and objectives. Obviously, survival is the first priority. After that, it becomes, in reality, situational dependent.

The intensity of interests can be affected by a variety of factors: geographic location, treaty commitments, the presence of US forces, and the political and economic ties of a nation to the US. As an example, US ground forces maintain a forward presence in only two countries: Germany and South Korea. Forward presence implies that the US is willing to use force to deter aggression against these two countries. These factors can help the military strategist determine military objectives and develop an Army strategy to support these interests.

The security of Western Europe will continue to be a vital interest of the US. Our commitment is reflected in the military forces which are forward deployed in Europe and our active participation in NATO. With the diminished Soviet conventional threat, the issue becomes what size US military presence must be maintained as a forward deployed force. The increased warning time resulting from the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe can allow the US to reposition forces, depending upon the mission assigned to ground forces. Jeffrey Record agrees with President Bush about the importance of Western Europe.

He believes that:

Beyond the North American continent there are but two areas of the world of indisputably direct, vital strategic importance to the United States: Western Europe and Japan. The conquest of either or both would have immediate and irreparable military and economic consequences for the United States. ¹⁸

The economic ties between the US and Japan have inextricably linked the fortunes of the two countries. It is undoubtedly a vital interest to ensure the security of Japan. Just as important, the US commitment to the Republic of South Korea is longstanding and will continue well into the next century. US resolve is demonstrated by the forward deployment of US military forces to deter North Korean aggression. As in Western Europe, the issue will be what size force does the US really need to maintain in order to deter North Korea. Given the vast improvement of the South Korean armed forces and economy, can the South Koreans assume more of the direct defense role? Donald Nuechterlein points out that:

It should be possible for the United States, Japan, and China to provide jointly for South Korea's security, with the US ground contribution being reduced to a small force of about 5,000...the US should adjust its military role in NE Asia downward and encourage Japan and China also to increase their military cooperation. ¹⁹

Whether the US can convince China and Japan to provide major security assistance for Korea is certainly debatable. Of greater significance, what is Korea's own ability to shoulder some of the security load which could certainly "free up" some US ground forces?

Preserving the sovereignty of democratic nations and US allies is another area which could necessitate the commitment of ground forces. Pledges to Israel and Egypt will remain a cornerstone of US policy.

These pledges also may extend to emerging democratic governments in Panama, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.

The increasing potential for third world conflicts will certainly impact on US interests to promote stable regional military balances. This is already evident in the current Persian Gulf War. It is not inconceivable to imagine the Middle East as a hot bed of instability because of the Palestinian issue and the ambitions of Syria and Iran. The territorial and religious disputes between India and Pakistan could certainly erupt into a regional conflict which could threaten US interests.

Closer to home, a stable, conflict-free Americas is certainly a major interest of the US. Newly emerging democratic governments in Central America may be threatened by insurgencies and request US assistance. Current US efforts in Panama and El Salvador are only precursors of increased US involvement in this hemisphere. While the majority of the involvement will be economic in nature, the probability of low intensity conflict to protect US citizens or combat insurgencies is very high.

The increase in international terrorism has placed new intensity in the US interest to protect US citizens and institutions. Third world nations eagerly embrace this form of warfare because of its tremendous psychological and political impact. As US firms and interests expand into the growing international economy, they become targets of opportunity for terrorists to exploit. This could easily be the most likely battleground of the future.

President Bush has declared "war on drugs" to reduce the flow of drugs into the US, especially through our southern border. He is advocating assistance to countries where drugs are produced so that they can reduce drug production. Also, he wants to use elements of the armed forces to detect and monitor the transportation of drugs across the US border. 20

IMPLICATIONS OF US INTERESTS

It is obvious that the sweeping changes in the strategic environment will have a significant impact on US interests. The familiar cloak of bipolarity has evaporated along with the familiar Soviet threat to Western Europe. The world's increasing economic interdependence will provide new challenges for the interpretation of US national interests especially in Third World conflicts. Mr. Todd Greentree argues that

The diminishing of containment as a national security justification for involvement in Third World conflict exposes the definition of US interests to a new range of ambiguities regarding the where and how of US policy. This would be relatively simple, for example, for terrorist acts against US citizens. It is less clear where internal revolts seem to threaten US interests or challenge US prestige. 21

This will have a direct effect on military strategy and ultimately Army force requirements. Military strategy will have to consider the following trends:

1. The US will continue to be a global superpower willing to use force to protect its interests.
2. Ground forces will maintain a reduced forward presence in Germany and South Korea.

3. The security of Germany, Japan, and South Korea will be vital interests of the US.
4. The Soviet Union remains the only nation that can destroy the US because of its nuclear capability.
5. The emergence of regional powers will affect military stability and threaten US and allied interests.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The national military strategy has traditionally created a requirements versus capabilities mismatch. This mismatch has evolved because JCS planners use a worst case scenario that envisions simultaneous conflicts in separate theaters. This has been identified by the terms "1 1/2" or "2 1/2" wars involving a major conflict with the Soviet Union in Western Europe and a simultaneous, lesser conflict, e.g. a North Korean attack on South Korea.

The US in the postwar era (WWII) has never possessed military power sufficient to deliver on all its defense commitments overseas, and certainly not simultaneously. Realization of stated goals for a "2 1/2" war and even a "1 1/2" war capability has consistently eluded the Pentagon.²²

However, the diminished Soviet threat has lessened the probability of simultaneous conflicts. While our current national security strategy still plans for simultaneous conflicts, the President's decision to reduce defense expenditures may indicate less willingness to pay the costs of a multi-conflict capability. So, I propose that the reality of budget reductions is an acceptance of the sequential conflict approach.

As Jeffrey Record points out, " Commitments that are not threatened simultaneously can be sustained by force levels smaller than those needed to defend all of them at the same time." 23

The 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) provides the JCS's strategic vision for military strategy for the 1990s. It outlines the military objectives to support the US national interests and provides broad guidance for conventional forces priorities and force structures. Reviewing this document reveals nine broad military objectives:

1. Deter war across the spectrum of conflict and, if this fails, terminate conflict on terms most favorable to the US.
2. Encourage political reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
3. Achieve mutually balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons.
4. Maintain stable alliance relationships.
5. Maintain global influence and freedom of action.
6. Protect free commerce and access to markets.
7. Stem drug flow into the US.
8. Inhibit the proliferation of NBC weapons.
9. Prohibit the transfer of military technology to potential adversaries. 24

When these broad objectives are analyzed in the context of the changing strategic environment, the changing Soviet threat, the looming reduction in defense expenditures, and the evolution of US interests in a multipolar world the role of US Army forces begins to crystallize. The JMNA provides more broad guidance in relation to the above factors.

The US will continue to employ a strategy of flexible response with a credible capability to deter conventional attack against the US and

other areas in which it has interests. The US strategy of forward defense will be accomplished through forward presence but with reduced US forces and more reliance on allied efforts. Further, the strategy must rely on CONUS force projection units capable of executing contingency operations at the regional level and reinforcing forward presence forces. US conventional forces must be mobile, flexible, sustainable, and technologically advanced. 25

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has further refined this force projection concept in the last twelve months. Gen. Powell envisions a base force which is a minimal force capability below which the US cannot go without reducing commitments or redefining national interests. He further divides this force into an Atlantic force (oriented on Europe and SW Asia), a Pacific force, a Contingency force, and a Strategic force. 26 This strategic force structure provides the Army a credible framework to produce a force development strategy for the coming decades.

On 19 February 1991, during the Pentagon Budget Hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Secretary of Defense Cheney revealed the Defense Department's Plan for Army force structure. He stated that the most significant event, affecting defense guidance, was the diminished Soviet threat to Europe and the resultant increase in warning time. Further, US budget deficit problems and increasing domestic issues would significantly reduce defense expenditures. He plans to reduce US forces by twenty five per cent by 1996. By that time, the Army will have 12 active divisions, 6 reserve component divisions,

and two cadre divisions (a mixture of active and reserve personnel), 27
Thus, the Defense Department has provided the Army a "mark on the wall"
to organize its future force structure. The Army's challenge is to
develop a strategy that applies these limited resources to achieve the
required ends.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

It is in the area of conventional forces where the changing
strategic environment and military balance will have the most impact. As
Sir Michael Howard states: " It is this warfighting capability
(conventional forces) that acts as the true deterrent to aggression and
is the only one that is convertible to political influence." 28
Protecting US interests in a multipolar world demands lethal, deployable
ground forces to deter or defeat aggression by regional powers.

Our flexible response strategy will continue to be a blend of
nuclear and conventional forces. While our nuclear weapons are an
effective deterrent against nuclear war, they will be ineffective
against regional aggression and insurgencies. Richard Szafranski
believes that we are entering an era when the likelihood for armed
interventions to protect our nation's interests by affecting the affairs
of other organized groups or states could increase. " It matters little
whether we call this class of armed intervention low-intensity conflict,
or contingency and limited-objective warfare or some other name." 29

Our strategy also required a large forward deployed force in
Western Europe under the nuclear umbrella. As General Carl Vuono, Army
Chief of Staff, points out,

Flexible response has moved away from an exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons. It recognized the necessity for powerful conventional forces to provide forward deployed units with a genuine capacity to contain and defeat aggression without immediate and automatic escalation to nuclear war. ³⁰

The question the Army must address is how large should the forward deployed force in Europe be? It appears that the national strategy is subtly shifting from forward defense to forward presence. This presence would be supported by rapidly deployable CONUS reinforcing units.

This shift to forward presence acknowledges the change in the Soviet threat and evolving security relationships with US allies. It further recognizes that the most likely threats to US interests will be from regional struggles among developing nations (Iran, Iraq, India, and Pakistan are current examples). Therefore, US forces will be more involved in contingency operations than ever before.

The final, and perhaps most significant implication is the movement to reduce the requirements versus capabilities mismatch. There is an implied assumption that regional conflicts will be sequential and the probability for horizontal escalation will be much lower. This will have an important impact on Army force planning. Jeffrey Record believes that:

A modest mismatch (between military objectives and capabilities) is also tolerable—even economically desirable— in peacetime, especially if force planning reflects a clear sense of strategic priorities and is predicated on sequential rather than simultaneous engagement of the designated threat. ³¹

Moreover, the pressure to reduce defense expenditures indicates an unwillingness to pay for large general purpose forces capable of engaging in simultaneous conflicts. Budget constraints do have an impact on national military strategy and must be considered. Mr. Earl Ravenal argues:

Our domestic system places constraints upon American power-not only its projection but its very generation. Domestic factors are assimilated into national strategies, whether the decision maker wills it or not. ³²

ARMY STRATEGY: THE ART OF MAKING CHOICES

The Army strategy must be able to define the military objectives which will support our national interests based upon the guidance from the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Using these objectives, the Army must develop courses of action, in conjunction with each warfighting CINC, and allocate resources to implement the course of action. Jeffrey Record proposes that:

The essence of strategy at any level is the tailoring of goals to resources within a specific internal and external military environment... strategy is the calculated relationship between purpose and power. It involves choices within a framework of finite resources, and an ability to distinguish between the essential and the expendable. ³³

To build this framework, I will first outline the assumptions and the constraints which the Army strategy must consider. Next, I will propose the priorities for the national interests from the Army perspective. Once the assumptions, constraints, and priorities are presented, the framework for the Army strategy will be built. Using this framework, I will construct the military objective (end), military course of action (way) and military resources (means) required to support the national interest.

ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions evolve from the analysis of the strategic environment. For a future developmental strategy, the Army must make projections about the impact of the economic, political, and military changes which will affect force requirements. If any of the assumptions change, then the Army strategy must be revised.

Assumption #1. The US will continue to be a global power. That is, national policy will not return to "isolationism". The US public will reluctantly support armed intervention but it must be quick and decisive.

Assumption #2. The US will avoid unilateral action. Coalition warfare will become the preferred method of intervention.

Assumption #3. The US will have sufficient warning time to respond to a Soviet conventional threat to Western Europe. The probability of a surprise conventional attack is very low.

Assumption #4. Congress will approve the Defense Department's recommendation that the Army contain 20 divisions by 1996 with an end strength of 535,000.

Assumption #5. Regional conflicts will not escalate into a global war. US leadership will be able to use political influence, in conjunction with allies, to limit conflicts. The probability of conflict simultaneity will be low.

Assumption #6: The Soviet Union, because of its nuclear capability, will be the only nation that can threaten the survival of

the US as a nation. No country will have a ground force that can threaten the land mass of the US. Therefore, defense of the US against a ground attack will not be a primary requirement for Army forces. That is, CONUS based forces with force projection missions could assume this mission if necessary.

CONSTRAINTS

The Defense budget will not fund unlimited forces. The Army must allocate funds between force structure, readiness, modernization, and procurement. Further, Army forces will be required to fight across the entire spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity conflict.

Some presence will be required in Europe and South Korea. Whatever Army course of action is recommended will determine the size of those forces. In order to meet all defense obligations, some dual commitment of forces may be necessary.

Strategic air and sea lift assets are limited. This will affect the mobility of CONUS based force projection units.

The peacetime budget is not designed to support a force structure to win a global war. If a global war erupts, then full mobilization is required to generate sufficient forces to successfully terminate this type of large scale conflict.

PRIORITIES: WHO'S ON FIRST?

Since strategy is the art of making choices in a constrained environment, an Army strategy must establish priorities among the national interests it must support.

Clearly, vital interests are the top priority since, by definition, these affect the survival of the country. After vital interests, importance becomes more debatable and depends upon the US leadership's policy interpretations. In reality, even vital interests are subject to change.

In reviewing US national interests and the national military objectives, I will use the following priority to develop an Army strategy.

Interest #1: Maintain the security of Western Europe.

Interest #2: Maintain the security of Japan.

Interest #3: Maintain the security of South Korea.

Interest #4: Maintain regional stability to preserve access to the Persian Gulf and the Panama Canal.

Interest #5: Preserve the sovereignty of emerging democratic nations and any other friendly nation.

Interest #6: Protect US citizens and property in foreign countries from terrorism or aggression.

Interest #7: Reduce the flow of drugs into the United States.

This list illustrates only those interests which Army forces may be required to support as part of joint operations with the Navy and Air Force. The operational strategy to employ Army forces is the responsibility of the Theater CINC. But the Army must have a development strategy to organize, train, equip, and sustain ground forces in support of the CINCs' operational plans.

The shift in our flexible response strategy from forward defense to forward presence, supplemented by power projection, will require the Army strategy to consider other priorities. Mr. Robert Haffa maintains that:

The macro-perspective on planning US military forces may be the most ignored decision level... Judgments are required not only on the size and structure of the force, but also on the mix of force modernization, readiness, and sustainability. ³⁴

Army forces must be mobile, flexible, sustainable, and technologically advanced. With a reduced budget, the Army strategy must identify how to attain these capabilities and rank their importance.

Tactical and strategic mobility will be the most critical capability in order to execute the force projection concept. The difficulty of predicting the future threat in regional conflicts, places greater importance on flexibility. For the Army, this translates into a mix of heavy, light, and special operations forces. Since the most likely conflict will probably occur in a region where the US does not have forward presence ground forces, the Army's capability to sustain ground forces in an austere environment is the next most important. Finally, the Army must continue to develop technologically advanced weapons. Although this capability is the lowest priority, it does not diminish its significance. This means that procurement would not be funded as much as it could be.

THE STRATEGY: PULLING IT ALL TOGETHER

With the assumptions, constraints, and priorities identified, we are now ready to develop the ends, ways, and means of the Army strategy.

The ends will be expressed as military objectives: deter, defend, defeat. The ways will be framed as military concepts or courses of action. Courses of action could include: forward basing, force projection, strategic reserves, security assistance, or prepositioned stocks. The means portion will include the military resources to implement the course of action. These may include conventional and unconventional forces, active and reserve forces, and allied forces. 35

Interest: Maintain security of Western Europe.

Military Objectives. Deter a Soviet conventional attack against our NATO allies. If attacked, defend in coordination with NATO allies, to prepare for decisive operations. Defeat a Soviet attack in order to restore the pre-conflict boundaries.

Military Concept. Achieve deterrence through the forward basing of US combat forces as part of a NATO multinational Corps (US) and the prepositioning of equipment for two heavy divisions. Provide specialized elements to assist in the verification of CFE and START programs. Defend to delay until arrival of reinforcing units from CONUS. Reinforcing units continue to defend and prepare for offensive operations. Upon full mobilization, conduct offensive operations to defeat the Soviet Union. If horizontal escalation occurs, the European theater will be the main effort and economy of force operations will be conducted in other theaters.

Warning time creates the greatest risk for this concept. During the transition from deterrence to defense, reinforcing units will be deploying to Western Europe. Given the revised warning time estimates stated earlier, forward based forces could be reduced to the lowest level necessary to demonstrate our resolve. Further, forward based forces limit the Army's flexibility to respond to conflicts outside of Europe. Politically and militarily, it will be extremely difficult to deploy forces outside of Europe because it would negate their primary purpose: deterrence through presence.

Military Resources. The forward based US Corps would contain a US heavy division, a separate armored brigade, and all of the Corps' organic combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Three other US heavy divisions (two active and one reserve) would be assigned to this Corps but would be stationed in CONUS. To improve the active CONUS divisions' mobility, they would utilize two POMCUS sets in Europe.

A second CONUS based Corps must be available for the initial phases of the defensive campaign. This Corps would consist of four heavy divisions (two active and two reserve). To enhance mobility and flexibility, this Corps would have one division's worth of equipment on maritime prepositioned ships. This flexibility will be necessary because this Corps will also have a reinforcing role to SW Asia.

A third CONUS based Corps, later described as the Contingency Corps, would also reinforce Europe. This Corps would contain four active divisions.

To be feasible, the national command authority must make an early decision to mobilize. Three of the divisions allocated in the above force structure are reserve divisions. Based on the Persian Gulf War experience, these units will need at least four months of intensive training before deployment. Also, there would be two cadre divisions (a unit composed of both active and reserve personnel) available for deployment after mobilization and train-up.

Thus, the Army would have three Corps available to defend Europe with two cadre divisions in CONUS reserve. These Corps would have five active heavy divisions, one active light division, one active airborne division, one active air assault division, and three reserve heavy divisions. Remaining active forces would be held in strategic reserve or would be committed to economy of force operations.

Whether the US and its NATO allies could generate sufficient combat power to defeat the Soviet Union without total mobilization is certainly debatable. If the conflict were confined solely to the European theater and the US mobilized reserve units quickly, it is possible. This is one of the risks of our national military strategy and a reduced defense budget. However, given the Soviet's internal problems it is acceptable.

Interest: Maintain the security of Korea and Japan.

Military Objectives. Deter a North Korean attack against South Korea. If attacked, defend in coordination with South Korean forces to prepare for decisive operations. Defeat North Korea by conducting offensive operations to restore pre-conflict boundaries.

The threat of a ground attack against Japan is remote. Given the geography of the Pacific region, Japan's security would be best achieved by US naval and air forces. Therefore, the Army strategy would not allocate forces for the defense of Japan. However, US ground forces in the Pacific could have contingency missions for that eventuality.

Military Concept. Achieve deterrence through the forward basing of reduced US combat forces and the pre positioning of one heavy division's equipment. Also, employ security assistance to improve the armor and anti-armor capabilities of South Korean forces. If attacked, defend initially with one US Corps to delay North Korean forces until the arrival of the Contingency Corps from CONUS. Be prepared to conduct offensive operations to defeat the North Koreans.

The North Korean Army has a formidable armor threat. The South Korean Army has superb infantry. US forces should be tailored to delay and defeat an armor threat.

As with Western Europe, warning time is the greatest risk in this concept. US active forces would need sufficient response time to deploy from Hawaii and CONUS. Reserve forces would need time to mobilize and train-up before deployment.

Military Resources. The forward based forces would consist of a separate armored brigade, a corps forward headquarters, and selected corps combat, combat support and service support units. Again, the corps combat units would be tailored to delay an armor threat. The Corps would consist of the separate armored brigade, an active heavy division in CONUS, an active light division in Hawaii, and two reserve heavy divisions in CONUS. The corps main headquarters would be in CONUS.

To improve mobility, the active heavy division could use the prepositioned equipment in South Korea.

To improve the defensive capability or to conduct offensive operations, the Contingency Corps of four active divisions would be available. It is difficult to predict the exact threat but these resources would provide the Pacific theater with potent forces to execute the CINC's campaign plan for the Korean peninsula.

Sustainability would be enhanced by positioning selected corps combat service support units in South Korea. Also, South Korea will be able to provide substantial host nation support. This asset will greatly improve US forces sustainability.

Interest: Maintain regional stability to preserve access to the Persian Gulf oil resources for all nations.

Military Objectives. Deter aggression which could impede the world's access to Middle East oil. Defend against regional attacks that threaten the political and economic stability of countries friendly to the US. Defeat aggression and restore stability in accordance with US policy.

Military Concept. Maintain CONUS force projection units that can deploy combat elements within 18 hours of notification in order to deter aggression by a regional power. Be prepared to deploy a Contingency Corps using strategic air and sea lift to defend US interests. Employ a heavy division's set of equipment on maritime pre positioned ships in the SW Asia region.

Military Resources. A Contingency Corps of four active divisions, with a rapid deployment capability will be the deterrent force.

To improve mobility, one heavy division's set of equipment (mentioned in the military concept) would be pre positioned on ships in theater. To improve sustainability, most corps combat support and service support units would be active duty rather than reserve. This Corps would also be capable of defensive operations for a limited period.

For extended defensive operations or to initiate offensive operations another CONUS based Corps must be deployed. This Corps would contain two active heavy divisions and two reserve heavy divisions.

This theater entails the greatest risk for ground forces because the US does not have any forward based ground forces. Initial operations in an austere environment will be extremely challenging. Host nation support and basing facilities will be critical not only for initial entry but for sustainability.

Interest: Maintain regional stability to ensure unimpeded access to the Panama Canal.

Military Objectives. Deploy to secure the Panama Canal. Protect key installations of the Panama Canal. Deter terrorist and insurgent threats to the Panama Canal and if attacked defeat them.

Military Concept. Deploy force projection units within 18 hours of notification to secure and protect the Canal Zone.

Employ special operations forces to conduct counter terrorist operations in order to secure the Canal Zone. Be prepared to conduct forced entry operations in order to establish force presence.

When the Canal is turned over to Panama, in accordance with the current treaty, the US may have to forcibly enter the Canal Zone in

order to protect US interests. Possible regional threats are mainly light infantry forces with small mechanized elements. The greatest threat would be a terrorist operation to sabotage key installations along the Canal.

Military Resources. The Contingency Corps, with four active divisions, is configured to complete this task. It has an airborne division, light infantry division, air assault division, and a heavy division which it can tailor to meet the conflict requirements. Special operations forces consisting of Ranger battalions or Delta force units could conduct direct action and counter terrorist operations.

Interest: Preserve the sovereignty of emerging democratic nations and any other friendly nation.

Military Objectives. Defeat insurgency forces in host nation. Defeat attacks from adjoining hostile countries.

Military Concepts. Provide security assistance to improve military capabilities of the host nation. Conduct counter insurgency operations to defeat insurgents and reinforce the host nation government.

Military Resources. Special forces units are trained in unconventional warfare and security assistance. The amount of security assistance missions in the coming decades will increase as emerging governments struggle for stability. To meet worldwide commitments on a recurring, continuous basis; the Army will need two special forces groups.

A light infantry division should be available to conduct counter insurgency operations. This division would be assigned to the Contingency Corps.

if the counter insurgency operation should escalate beyond the light division's capabilities, then the Contingency Corps would have to assume the responsibility. The risk is that the counter insurgency operation would develop into a protracted struggle without a decisive victory.

Interest: Protect US citizens in foreign countries.

Military Objective. Defeat terrorist attempts to kidnap or harm US citizens.

Military Concept. Conduct counter terrorist operations to rescue US citizens and reduce terrorist capabilities. Special operations forces must be specially trained in these sensitive operations as they will likely be covert in nature and politically sensitive.

Military Resources. While this objective does not require a large quantity of forces, they must be highly trained. Counter terrorist forces must be highly skilled and equipped with sophisticated communication equipment and weapons.

Interest: Reduce the flow of drugs into the US.

Military Objectives: Detect and monitor the transportation of drugs to the US. Reduce the production of drugs.

Military Concept. In coordination with US law enforcement agencies, provide intelligence and detection capabilities to detect the movements of drug traffickers across US borders. Provide security assistance to host nations who are trying to eliminate drug production. Security assistance should provide resources that improve the host nation's tactical intelligence and combat operations against drug producers and insurgents.

Military Resources. Army intelligence and aviation assets can assist in monitoring the transportation of drugs. Security assistance in the form of mobile training teams can help host nations.

IMPLICATIONS OF AN ARMY STRATEGY

This analysis generates a force structure that is smaller than the 20 divisions which the Secretary of Defense is recommending. Under this plan, the Army would have four Corps composed of eleven active divisions, five reserve divisions, and two separate brigades. Two cadre divisions would be part of the strategic reserve. Special operations forces would consist of two Special Forces Groups, a Ranger Regiment, and an anti-terrorist force.

Reducing the force structure by an additional one active and one reserve division allows the Army to reallocate scarce dollars. To enhance mobility, the strategy requires four sets of prepositioned divisional equipment: two at fixed sites in Europe, one in South Korea, and one aboard ships with priority to SW Asia. To enhance sustainability, the Contingency Corps' combat support and service support units will be active units instead of the traditional reliance on reserve units. The strategy also provides flexibility. Of the active divisions, two are light, one is airborne, one is air assault, and six are heavy. The five reserve divisions are all heavy. Finally, the regional orientation of the four Corps provide a natural alignment with the Chairman's base force concept and the warfighting Cincs' theaters.

SUMMARY

As Colonel Michael J. Connor, US Army, once said, " If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there." This study attempts to provide a developmental strategy to guide Army force structure, modernization, and procurement in the future. It recognizes the significant constraints of the budget reductions on near term capabilities. It advocates making the hard decision to cut force structure to maintain a quality force and enhance mobility and modernization.

The Army's road to success has been quality soldiers with quality training and quality equipment. This focus must continue. By accepting reasonable risk in the changing strategic environment, the Army can free scarce dollars from force structure to improve mobility, readiness, sustainability, and equipment modernization.

This strategy also attempts to free the Army from the albatross of a threat based force structure. While the threat estimate is important, it should not be the ultimate discriminator. Force capability is just as important, if not more so. The recent Persian Gulf War is an excellent example of the weaknesses of the threat based approach. On paper, the Iraqi army outnumbered the coalition forces and appeared to be superior. The test of combat disproved this theory.

In the next two decades, the most likely conflict will be a limited war erupting from the clashes of developing nations. These countries will have modern, lethal weapons and significant ground forces. If these conflicts threaten US interests, the Army will ultimately have to terminate the conflict on favorable terms. The Army must be ready to fight. As T. R. Fehrenbach so poetically observed:

You may fly over a land forever. You may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life. But if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did- by putting your young men into the mud. ³⁶

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